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Abstract
The U.S. Supreme Court is currently deliberating over whether a proposed mathematical
formula should be used to detect unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. We show that in
some cases, this formula will only flag bizarrely shaped districts as potentially constitutional.
In 1812, the Boston Gazette published a political cartoon that likened the contorted shape
of a Massachusetts state senate election district to the profile of a salamander [7]. The cartoon
insinuated that Governor Elbridge Gerry approved this district’s shape for his party’s benefit,
thereby coining the portmanteau “gerrymander.” Ever since, it has been common practice to
use geometry as a signal for gerrymandering, with the most egregious districts exhibiting bizarre
shapes; see [8, 13] for example. To help bring this geometric signal to gerrymandering court cases, a
team of Boston-based mathematicians known as the Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group
is currently offering expert witness training in a sequence of Geometry of Redistricting workshops
across the country [10].
Partisan gerrymandering is the subject of a U.S. Supreme Court decision expected next year [5].
In this case, the justices will evaluate a completely different approach to detect gerrymandering.
Instead of flagging districts with irregular shapes, the proposed method attempts to detect the
intended consequence of partisan gerrymandering: one party wasting substantially more votes than
the other party. This method summarizes the disproportion of wasted votes in a tidy statistic
known as efficiency gap.
Recently, Bernstein and Duchin [2] provided a helpful discussion of efficiency gap, in which they
mention that it sometimes incentivizes bizarrely shaped districts. This is perhaps counterintuitive
considering the geometry-infused history of gerrymandering. In this note, we demonstrate an
extreme version of this observation:
Sometimes, a small efficiency gap is only possible with bizarrely shaped districts.
Specifically, we show that every districting system must violate one of three well-established desider-
ata that we make explicit later: one person, one vote; Polsby–Popper compactness; and partisan
efficiency. As such, our result is reminiscent of Arrow’s impossibility theorem concerning ranked
voting electoral systems [1].
Definition 1. A districting system is a function that receives disjoint finite sets A,B ⊆ [0, 1]2
and a positive integer k, and then outputs a partition D1 unionsq · · · unionsqDk = [0, 1]2.
Here, A and B correspond to voter locations from two major parties, respectively; we do
not consider third-party voters. In practice, districts are drawn given the locations of the entire
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population from census data, but A and B can be estimated using past election data; in particular,
these estimates enable partisan gerrymandering. We focus on districting systems for the unit square
largely for convenience, and without loss of generality. Indeed, one may partition any state with
such a districting system by first inscribing the state in a square, and conversely, a districting
system on any state determines a system for the square by inscribing a square in that state.
When evaluating a given districting system f : (A,B, k) 7→ {Di}ki=1, one may test for any
number of desirable characteristics. What follows is a list of such characteristics. Here, when we
say “the districts always satisfy” a given condition, we mean that all possible choices of (A,B, k)
simultaneously allow for {Di}ki=1 = f(A,B, k) to satisfy that condition.
(i) One person, one vote. There exists δ ∈ [0, 1) such that the districts always satisfy
(1− δ)
⌊ |A ∪B|
k
⌋
≤ ∣∣(A ∪B) ∩Di∣∣ ≤ (1 + δ)⌈ |A ∪B|
k
⌉
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. (1)
In words, the districts are drawn to contain roughly equal numbers of voters. Assuming
equal voter turnout, this is equivalent to the districts containing roughly equal represented
populations. The latter has been a guiding principle for all levels of redistricting in the
United States following a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s, namely Gray
v. Sanders, Reynolds v. Sims, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Avery v. Midland County [16].
(ii) Polsby–Popper compactness. There exists C > 0 such that the districts always satisfy
|∂Di|2 ≤ C|Di| ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. (2)
Here, |∂Di| denotes the perimeter of Di, whereas |Di| denotes its area. In 1991, Polsby and
Popper [14] introduced their so-called Polsby–Popper score, defined by 4pi|Di|/|∂Di|2, as
a measure of geographic compactness. Their intent was to allow for an enforceable stan-
dard (e.g., no district shall score below 0.2 without additional scrutiny) that would “make
the gerrymanderer’s life a living hell.” In this spirit, Arizona’s redistricting commission in
2000 used the Polsby–Popper score to ensure geographic compactness amongst their voting
districts [11]. The exceedingly long perimeters of the 1st and 12th congressional districts of
North Carolina were cited in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case Cooper v. Harris, in which
the Court ruled that both districts were the result of unconstitutional racial gerrymander-
ing [3]. At the time, these were two of the three congressional districts across the country
with the smallest Polsby–Popper scores [13].
(iii) Partisan efficiency. There exist α, β > 0 such that the districts always satisfy∣∣EG(D1, . . . , Dk;A,B)∣∣ < 1
2
− α whenever ∣∣|A| − |B|∣∣ < β|A ∪B|. (3)
Here, the so-called efficiency gap EG(·;A,B) quantifies the extent to which votes are dis-
proportionately “wasted” by the districting. Suppose |A ∩Di| > |B ∩Di|. Then the number
of wasted votes in A ∩Di is the excess
|A ∩Di| −
⌈
1
2
∣∣(A ∪B) ∩Di∣∣⌉,
considering A did not need these votes to carry the district Di. Meanwhile, all of the votes
in B ∩ Di were wasted, since they did not contribute to winning any district. Letting wA,i
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and wB,i denote the wasted votes in A ∩Di and B ∩Di, respectively, then the efficiency gap
is defined by
EG(D1, . . . , Dk;A,B) :=
1
|A ∪B|
k∑
i=1
(
wA,i − wB,i
)
.
Stephanopoulos and McGhee introduced the efficiency gap in [17], and it plays a key role in the
U.S. Supreme Court case Gill v. Whitford ; the Court is currently deliberating over whether
this gap should be used to signal unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering [5]. We note that
the efficiency gap can range anywhere from 0 to 1/2, and Stephanopoulos and McGhee suggest
that a gap of 8% or more is sufficient to flag potential partisan gerrymandering. Bernstein
and Duchin [2] observe that such a small efficiency gap is only possible when neither A nor B
make up more than 79% of the vote. In particular, there already exist A and B for which no
choice of districts satisfies (3) with α = 0.50− 0.08 = 0.42 and β > 0.79− (1− 0.79) = 0.58.
By comparison, our notion of partisan efficiency is particularly weak since we allow α and β
to be arbitrarily small.
Observe that (i) and (ii) are agnostic to the voting preferences of A and B; in particular, (i)
only depends on A ∪ B, whereas (ii) only sees the resulting districts. Meanwhile, (iii) explicitly
distinguishes between A and B. In practice, (iii) would be evaluated after election day, though it
could be predicted with the help of past election data. While (i), (ii) and (iii) have the form “there
exist constant(s) such that the districts always satisfy some condition,” the court may assign values
for δ, C, α and β, explicitly requiring the districts to satisfy (1), (2) and (3) with these parameters.
The following theorem establishes that such a requirement would not always be feasible:
Theorem 2. There is no districting system that simultaneously satisfies all three desiderata above.
In particular, for every δ, C, α, β and k, there exist A and B such that every choice of districts
{Di}ki=1 violates one of (1), (2) and (3).
Notably, our result does not require the districts to be connected. The idea behind the proof is
straightforward: We consider homogeneous mixtures of voters in the unit square, where just over
half of the voters belong to A, and just under half belong to B. In this extreme case, one would
need to surgically design a district in order for B to be the majority while simultaneously being
large enough to satisfy (i). This surgery would in turn force the district to exhibit bizarre shape,
i.e., its Polsby–Popper score would be quite small (see Figure 1). As such, districts satisfying both
(i) and (ii) are necessarily majority-A. All told, A wastes a tiny portion of its votes, whereas B
wastes all of its votes, thereby violating (iii).
Before presenting the formal proof, we take a moment to discuss the result. First, one could
argue that our result does not necessarily preclude the real-world utility of (i), (ii) and (iii), as
the A and B we construct are perhaps not likely arise in practice. Indeed, our result does not
suggest that impossibility arrives from every possible distribution of voters. For example, if the
western half of the state were all blue and the eastern half were all red, then it would be straight-
forward to draw nice-looking districts with small efficiency gap. So now we have a spectrum of
distribution possibilities (from purely homogeneous to completely separated), and the real-world
partisan distributions reside somewhere along this spectrum. How does impossibility depend on
this spectrum, and where does reality reside? These are both interesting questions that warrant
further investigation.
Along these lines, we point out that perhaps surprisingly, the issue is not necessarily resolved by
the presence of partisan clusters. For instance, you can modify the example in Figure 1 by selecting
a contiguous portion of the map and changing all the red votes in that region to blue. While this
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would result in a blue partisan cluster, the modification would not change the fact that all districts
in the middle panel are majority blue, and so the efficiency gap would still be quite large. One
could argue that the congressional districts in Massachusetts present a real-world example of this
phenomenon, as all of the seats in this state are occupied by Democrats even though the districts
do not exhibit bizarre shape.
While our impossibility result identifies a tension between Polsby–Popper compactness and par-
tisan efficiency, we suspect there is a more general meta-theorem dictating a fundamental tradeoff
between geographic compactness and simple quantifications of partisan gerrymandering. For ex-
ample, the A and B we construct demonstrates impossibility with any alternative to efficiency gap
that would disallow a slight majority winning every district. One such alternative is proportionality,
which requires the number of seats won across the state to be roughly proportional to the number
of votes cast; impossibility here is perhaps a moot point since the U.S. Supreme Court already
established in Davis v. Bandemer that proportionality is not a valid constitutional standard.
Many states have laws requiring voting districts to exhibit geographic compactness [9], but
there is no standard approach to measure compactness. For example, as an alternative to Polsby–
Popper, one could ask that a district’s area be sufficiently large compared to either the smallest
circle containing the district or the district’s convex hull [15]. It appears that the techniques in our
proof do not easily transfer to these alternatives. In particular, forcing the districts to be convex
already presents what appears to be an interesting problem in additive combinatorics, which we
leave for future work.
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix k. For n large, partition [0, 1]2 into squares of edge length  = 1/n. Take
a, b and ` such that a + b = `2, and let L denote the lattice ( 1n`(Z +
1
2))
2. Define A to have a
voters in each -square intersect L, and define B to have b voters in each -square intersect L. See
Figure 1 for an illustration.
Now take a partition into districts D1 unionsq · · · unionsq Dk = [0, 1]2 that satisfies (i) and (ii). Pick
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The -squares that contain ∂Di are in turn contained in an 
√
2-thickened version
of ∂Di, which has area at most
√
2|∂Di| + 2pi2. As such, ∂Di is contained in at most E :=√
2|∂Di|/ + 2pi different -squares. Meanwhile, Di contains at least |Di|/2 − E and at most
|Di|/2 different -squares. Overall, we may conclude that A wins the district Di if the second
inequality below holds:
|A ∩Di| ≥ a
( |Di|
2
− E
)
≥ b
( |Di|
2
+ E
)
≥ |B ∩Di|.
Specifically, it suffices to have
b
a
≤ |Di| − 
2E
|Di|+ 2E ,
which by (ii) is implied by
b
a
≤ |∂Di|
2 − C2E
|∂Di|2 + C2E . (4)
Next, (i) gives that∣∣(A ∪B) ∩Di∣∣ ≥ (1− δ)⌊ |A ∪B|
k
⌋
≥ (1− δ) |A ∪B|
2k
= (1− δ)n
2`2
2k
,
and since these points lie in L, two of them must be of distance at least
√
(1− δ)/(2k) from each
other. As such, |∂Di| ≥
√
(1− δ)/(2k) =: F , and so (4) is implied by
b
a
≤ F
2 − CF√2− 2Cpi2
F 2 + CF
√
2+ 2Cpi2
. (5)
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Figure 1: (left) Voter locations in [0, 1]2. The blue and red dots correspond to A and B,
respectively. In this example, the unit square is partitioned into smaller squares of side length
 = 1/8. Each -square contains 9 voters in an ` × ` subset of a lattice with ` = 3. Of these
voters, a = 5 belong to A and b = 4 belong to B. (middle) Five districts drawn according to
the shortest splitline algorithm proposed by the Center for Range Voting in [6]. This algorithm
is specifically designed to produce districts that satisfy desiderata (i) and (ii). In particular, this
algorithm ignores voter preferences. In this case, the number of voters in each district is within
δ = 0.07 of the average and the smallest Polsby–Popper score 4pi|Di|/|∂Di|2 is over 0.70. (According
to the isoperimetric inequality [12], the largest score possible is 1, which is achieved uniquely by the
circle.) However, despite B making up 44% of the vote, A won every district. This is reflected in
the efficiency gap being over 38% in favor of A. (right) One may attempt to decrease the efficiency
gap by exploiting clusters in B. In this spirit, we hand-drew districts of similar size. The result
is five districts within δ = 0.04 of the average and an efficiency gap of about 2% in favor of A.
In exchange for this partisan efficiency, the smallest Polsby–Popper score is now about 0.12. For
reference, Case [4] suggests flagging scores below 0.20 as instances of possible gerrymandering. Our
main result (Theorem 2) establishes that this tradeoff is unavoidable with any districting system.
Observe that (5) is independent of our choice of i, and so (5) implies that A wins every district Di.
At this point, since n was chosen to be arbitrarily large,  is arbitrarily small, and so we may
pick a and b so that γ = 1− b/a > 0 is arbitrarily small while still satisfying (5). As such, B loses
every district, thereby wasting all bn2 = (1 − γ)an2 of its votes, whereas A narrowly wins every
district, thereby wasting at most an2 − bn2 = γan2 of its votes. Overall, the efficiency gap is
EG(D1, . . . , Dk;A,B) ≤ γan
2 − bn2
an2 + bn2
=
2γ − 1
2− γ ,
which is arbitrarily close to −1/2 despite∣∣|A| − |B|∣∣
|A ∪B| =
an2 − bn2
an2 + bn2
=
γ
2− γ
being arbitrarily small. Therefore, every districting system that satisfies both (i) and (ii) necessarily
violates (iii).
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